Since 9/11 there has been a burgeoning literature on terrorism written by journalists, scholars, policy makers, diplomats, and military professionals. The last decade has also witnessed a dramatic increase in suicide terrorist attacks-violent attacks designed to kill others where the death of the attacker is a necessary part of the action-especially against 
explanations of the underpinning of such violent and hostile behaviors and suggested policy response to such threats.
Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It
by Robert Pape and James Feldman, published in 2010, received In Dying to Win, Pape argued that suicide terrorism is more effective than other kinds of terrorist attacks. Through an analysis of the data on 315 known suicide attacks committed worldwide between 1980 and 2003, he found that suicide attacks represented only 3% of all terrorist incidents, but were responsible for 48% of the casualties and therefore more effective. He further posits that terrorism is not a unique Islamic phenomenon; rather it is a rational response to occupation, a form of coercion by punishment. Contrary to the popular belief that suicide terrorism stems from economic alienation and/or Islamic fanaticism-after all, the overwhelming majority of suicide attacks in recent years have been carried out by Muslims!-Pape argues that suicide attacks are aimed at compelling "modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland" (Pape 2005:4) . The suicide terrorists, in his view, are rational political actors who wage a form of asymmetrical warfare, using terror to pursue "politics by other means" (to use the Clausewitz dictum).
The hypothesis that military occupation is the root cause of suicide terrorism was further refined and substantiated with more empirical data and scholarly rigor in -1983-87, 1990-94,1995-2001, and 2002-2005-in which it "used suicide terrorism as an integral part of its military and political strategy [for twenty-six years] to achieve a Tamil homeland" (316). The group engaged in more than 150 suicide attacks against the hard targets, as a substitute for military operations they could not compete with by conventional means, and in the assassination of Sinhala-Buddhist national and local politicians and policemen; it did not indiscriminately target civilians. The authors, however, fail to take into account a number of suicide missions that had nothing to do
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with occupation but were aimed at the strategic objectives of LTTE-for example, the assassination of India's former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991) Regardless of how the U.S. finally responds and how the Syrian crisis is resolved, it is unlikely that the U.S. will get involved in another war in the Middle East or elsewhere soon. While scholars continue to debate whether Pape-Feldman's definition of occupation is too broad, or whether their methodology is flawed, the informed citizens and general readers of this war-weary nation faced with fiscal constraints find the arguments of Cutting the Fuse, backed by rich data, to be persuasive and appealing.
